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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.007 / rank
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Latest revision as of 20:22, 9 December 2024

scientific article
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At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency
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    At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency (English)
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    21 April 2017
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    outside options
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    endogenous termination
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    dissolution clauses
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    imperfect public monitoring
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    dynamic games
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    Identifiers

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