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Property / author
 
Property / author: Alvaro J. Name-Correa / rank
 
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Property / author
 
Property / author: Hüseyin Yıldırım / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104943 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2753984079 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 00:47, 29 July 2024

scientific article
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English
Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
scientific article

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    Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees (English)
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    7 November 2019
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    committee
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    blame
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    transparency
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    social pressure
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