Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections. (Q1410900): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: Attainable results in committee elections. / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Consensus rules for committee elections / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 09:59, 30 July 2024

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Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.
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    Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections. (English)
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    15 October 2003
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    collective choice
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    rule
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    manipulability
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    vote concentration
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    voting scheme
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