UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX (Q3421638): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Wolfgang R. Köhler / rank
 
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Property / cites work: An extension of the Nash bargaining solution to nonconvex problems / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Multi-issue bargaining with endogenous agenda / rank
 
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Property / cites work: A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906001028 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W3123057264 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 10:44, 30 July 2024

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UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX
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