Voting under constraints (Q1371133): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2301 / rank
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Property / author
 
Property / author: Salvador Barberá / rank
 
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Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2301 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2002196310 / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Generalized median social welfare functions / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof / rank
 
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Property / cites work: The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule / rank
 
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Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1997.2301 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 18:57, 10 December 2024

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Voting under constraints
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