Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (Q1926598): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0549-y / rank
 
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Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
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