Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present (Q1640935): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 23:01, 15 July 2024

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Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present
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    Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present (English)
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    14 June 2018
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    principal-agent modeling
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    contract design
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    stochastic process
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    stochastic control
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