On strategy-proof social choice under categorization (Q427520): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0539-0 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2071211011 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Dictatorial domains / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Dictators on blocks: Generalizations of social choice impossibility theorems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4449283 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Circular domains / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 08:58, 5 July 2024