Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: An old debate with a new look (Q547318): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0196-x
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+W1964259576
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W1964259576 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities
@@ Property / cites work: Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Excess Capacity and Collusion
@@ Property / cites work: Excess Capacity and Collusion / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4369417
@@ Property / cites work: Q4369417 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Technology transfer with commitment.
@@ Property / cites work: Technology transfer with commitment. / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity
@@ Property / cites work: Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity / rank @@
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