Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort (Q1602939): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Set profile property. |
Set OpenAlex properties. |
||
| (One intermediate revision by one other user not shown) | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments. / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / full work available at URL | |||
| Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00079-9 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
| Property / OpenAlex ID: W2015563421 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Latest revision as of 10:47, 30 July 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort |
scientific article |
Statements
Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort (English)
0 references
24 June 2002
0 references
competitive price
0 references
competitive contract
0 references
productive agent
0 references
