Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present (Q1640935): Difference between revisions
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Property / cites work: The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 23:01, 15 July 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present |
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Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present (English)
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14 June 2018
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principal-agent modeling
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contract design
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stochastic process
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stochastic control
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