Trading public goods stabilizes interspecific mutualism (Q1715097): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
Normalize DOI.
 
(3 intermediate revisions by 3 users not shown)
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.10.022 / rank
Normal rank
 
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.10.022 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2133025622 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / Wikidata QID
 
Property / Wikidata QID: Q50778269 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The volunteer's dilemma and the optimal size of a social group / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On the founder effect and the evolution of altruistic traits / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Conditions for the evolution of altruism under Darwinian selection / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3040961 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3407085 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Evolution of cooperation under \(N\)-person snowdrift games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.JTBI.2012.10.022 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 05:42, 11 December 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Trading public goods stabilizes interspecific mutualism
scientific article

    Statements

    Identifiers

    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references