Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation (Q1753433): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.12.011 / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.12.011 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 08:20, 11 December 2024

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Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation
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    Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation (English)
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    29 May 2018
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    decision support management
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    matching under preferences
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    course assignment
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    strategy-proofness
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    Pareto efficiency
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