Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal (Q1891349): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 11:31, 30 July 2024

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Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal
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    Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal (English)
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    30 May 1995
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    index of voting power
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    a priori relative voting power
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    weighted voting
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