Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee (Q2031168): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.010
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+W2893352895
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+Search by committee
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+Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
@@ Property / cites work: Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent / rank @@
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+Public Protests and Policy Making*
@@ Property / cites work: Public Protests and Policy Making* / rank @@
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+The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution
@@ Property / cites work: The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution / rank @@
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+Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
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+A Model of Expertise
@@ Property / cites work: A Model of Expertise / rank @@
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+Specialization and partisanship in committee search
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+Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
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