Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement (Q2415985): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.004
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+W2915182042
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+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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+A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
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+Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
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+WARP and combinatorial choice
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+The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
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+On the operation of multiple matching markets
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+Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
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+Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
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+Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
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+Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
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+School choice under partial fairness
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+Efficient assignment respecting priorities
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+Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities
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+(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
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+School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
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+Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
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+Two-sided matching with indifferences
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+Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
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+A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
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+Incentives in Teams
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+Effective affirmative action in school choice
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+On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
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+Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
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+The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
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+Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
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+Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
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+Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
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+On cores and indivisibility
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+Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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+Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
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+Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
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