Bribe-proof rules in the division problem (Q2462290): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.006 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 13:42, 27 June 2024

scientific article
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Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
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    Bribe-proof rules in the division problem (English)
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    30 November 2007
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    bribe-proofness
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    strategy-proofness
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    Pareto efficiency
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    replacement monotonicity
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    single-peakedness
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