Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 21:01, 24 June 2024

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Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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    Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (English)
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    24 October 2006
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