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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00222500500328928 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 12:13, 25 June 2024

scientific article
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English
Power, Embedded Games, and Coalition Formation
scientific article

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    Power, Embedded Games, and Coalition Formation (English)
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    29 January 2007
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    networks
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    exchange theory
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    rational choice theory
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    power
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    coalition formation
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    ruling class
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    Identifiers

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