Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements (Q651348): Difference between revisions

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-.1007/s10614-011-9285-8
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/s10614-011-9285-8 / rank @@
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+THE SIZE OF FARSIGHTED STABLE COALITIONS IN A GAME OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT
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+International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
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+Farsighted coalitional stability
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+Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
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+International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
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+Q3378952
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+Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
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+The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
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+Equilibrium binding agreements
@@ Property / cites work: Equilibrium binding agreements / rank @@
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+On the computation of stability in multiple coalition formation games
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+Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
@@ Property / cites work: Coalitional stability under perfect foresight / rank @@
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+.1007/S10614-011-9285-8
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S10614-011-9285-8 / rank @@
+Normal rank