Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents (Q1668496): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Nash implementation with partially honest individuals / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Implementation with evidence / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Role of honesty in full implementation / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Behavioral aspects of implementation theory / rank
 
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Property / cites work: On run-preventing contract design / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 11:26, 16 July 2024

scientific article
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English
Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents
scientific article

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    Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents (English)
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    29 August 2018
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    preference for honesty
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    implementation
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    mechanism design
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    behavioral economics
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    bank run
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