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Latest revision as of 14:02, 28 July 2024

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The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections
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    The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections (English)
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    4 April 2022
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    bribery
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    computational complexity
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    computational social choice
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    logic
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    quantifier assignment
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    sequential elections
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