Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods (Q2505520): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 19:50, 24 June 2024

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Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
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    Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods (English)
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    26 September 2006
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    The problem of allocating of indivisible goods is considered here. Without imposing budget balance two characterizations for the case of homogeneous indivisible goods and money are presented. First, the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms are characterized. Second, the Pareto undominated subsets in the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms are identified. The latter result improves the result by Svensson (2004) who provided a characterization in the case of heterogeneous indivisible goods and money.
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    indivisble goods
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    strategy-proof
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    envy-freeness
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    Groves mechanism
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    decision-efficiency
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    Pareto dominance relation
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