Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules (Q2432505): Difference between revisions

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+The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules
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+Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
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+Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
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+Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
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+Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
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+The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
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+The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
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+A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
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+Unsettling aspects of voting theory
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+On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
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+On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
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+Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
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