A note on the complexity of manipulating weighted Schulze voting (Q2203580): Difference between revisions

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+.09226
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+The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
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+When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
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+Barriers to Manipulation in Voting
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+Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control
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+Q4583963
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
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