Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security (Q1729670): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 06:20, 11 December 2024

scientific article
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Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
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    Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security (English)
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    28 February 2019
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    conflict mediation
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    all-pay auction
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    outside option
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    endogenous conflict
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    asymmetric auction
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    distributional strategy
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