Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures (Q944257): Difference between revisions

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-.1007/s00355-007-0287-3
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0287-3 / rank @@
-Normal rank
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+College admissions with affirmative action
@@ Property / cites work: College admissions with affirmative action / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
@@ Property / cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Constrained school choice
@@ Property / cites work: Constrained school choice / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1007/S00355-007-0287-3
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S00355-007-0287-3 / rank @@
+Normal rank