College admissions with stable score-limits (Q302118): Difference between revisions

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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
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+The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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+Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Q2921653
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+Finding large stable matchings
@@ Property / cites work: Finding large stable matchings / rank @@
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Q4130997
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+An analysis of the German university admissions system
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