Electoral institutions with impressionable voters (Q2093833): Difference between revisions

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-.1007/s00355-022-01406-6
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01406-6 / rank @@
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+One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
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+Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
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+Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory
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+Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
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+Q5848594
@@ Property / cites work: Q5848594 / rank @@
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+Learning aspiration in repeated games
@@ Property / cites work: Learning aspiration in repeated games / rank @@
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+An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories
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+An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
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+Evolving aspirations and cooperation
@@ Property / cites work: Evolving aspirations and cooperation / rank @@
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+On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
@@ Property / cites work: On the Theory of Strategic Voting1 / rank @@
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+Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
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+The strategic sincerity of approval voting
@@ Property / cites work: The strategic sincerity of approval voting / rank @@
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+Convergence of aspirations and (partial) cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma
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+Expressive Voting and Its Cost: Evidence From Runoffs With Two or Three Candidates
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1007/S00355-022-01406-6
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S00355-022-01406-6 / rank @@
+Normal rank