Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation (Q2351098): Difference between revisions

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+The joker effect: cooperation driven by destructive agents
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+The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
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+Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
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+Leaving the loners alone: evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
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+Evolutionary games defined at the network mesoscale: The Public Goods game
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+Replicator dynamics of reward \& reputation in public goods games
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+Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
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+Q5185817
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+Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
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+The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
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+Selection pressure transforms the nature of social dilemmas in adaptive networks
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+Escaping the tragedy of the commons via directed investments
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