Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas (Q274410): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Importer (talk | contribs)
Created a new Item
 
Normalize DOI.
 
(6 intermediate revisions by 6 users not shown)
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2016.02.002 / rank
Normal rank
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH DE Number
 
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6572785 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
two-sided matching
Property / zbMATH Keywords: two-sided matching / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
many-to-one-matching
Property / zbMATH Keywords: many-to-one-matching / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
market design
Property / zbMATH Keywords: market design / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
matching with contracts
Property / zbMATH Keywords: matching with contracts / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
matching with constraints
Property / zbMATH Keywords: matching with constraints / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
strategyproofness
Property / zbMATH Keywords: strategyproofness / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
deferred acceptance
Property / zbMATH Keywords: deferred acceptance / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2016.02.002 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2280742990 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5743384 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Effective affirmative action in school choice / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5417703 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Matching with quorums / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: An analysis of the German university admissions system / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ARTINT.2016.02.002 / rank
 
Normal rank
links / mardi / namelinks / mardi / name
 

Latest revision as of 13:07, 9 December 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
scientific article

    Statements

    Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    22 April 2016
    0 references
    two-sided matching
    0 references
    many-to-one-matching
    0 references
    market design
    0 references
    matching with contracts
    0 references
    matching with constraints
    0 references
    strategyproofness
    0 references
    deferred acceptance
    0 references

    Identifiers