C-complete sets for compromise stable games (Q471023): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 18:27, 9 December 2024
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English | C-complete sets for compromise stable games |
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C-complete sets for compromise stable games (English)
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13 November 2014
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The paper investigates the relationship between compromise stability of transferable utility games and efficient payoff vectors; specifically, the main results study the structure of the generators of the core cover, and conditions ensuring that the game is compromise stable.
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core
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core cover
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larginal vectors
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TU-game
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