Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling (Q6146432): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 11:44, 26 August 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7799765
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7799765

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    Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling (English)
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    5 February 2024
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    dynamic signaling
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    repeated signaling
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    reputation
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    attrition
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