College admissions with stable score-limits (Q302118): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1007/s10100-013-0320-9 / rank
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number
 
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6600671 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
college admissions
Property / zbMATH Keywords: college admissions / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
stable matching
Property / zbMATH Keywords: stable matching / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
mechanism design
Property / zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design / rank
 
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Property / MaRDI profile type: Publication / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2261176060 / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
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Property / DOI: 10.1007/S10100-013-0320-9 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 13:51, 9 December 2024

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College admissions with stable score-limits
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