Bank bailouts: moral hazard and commitment (Q6121881): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs
@@ Property / cites work: Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A bank runs model with a continuum of types
@@ Property / cites work: A bank runs model with a continuum of types / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
@@ Property / cites work: Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Dollarization, Bailouts, and the Stability of the Banking System
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Herding and bank runs
@@ Property / cites work: Herding and bank runs / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+NOISY SUNSPOTS AND BANK RUNS
@@ Property / cites work: NOISY SUNSPOTS AND BANK RUNS / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Macroprudential Regulation versus mopping up after the crash
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bailouts and Financial Fragility
@@ Property / cites work: Bailouts and Financial Fragility / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard
+Normal rank