Bargaining and inequity aversion: on the efficiency of the double auction (Q435782): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.027 / rank
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Property / cites work: Bargaining under Incomplete Information / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Bargaining solutions with non-standard objectives / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Optimal Auction Design / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading / rank
 
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Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.09.027 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 17:32, 9 December 2024

scientific article
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English
Bargaining and inequity aversion: on the efficiency of the double auction
scientific article

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    Bargaining and inequity aversion: on the efficiency of the double auction (English)
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    12 July 2012
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    bargaining
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    double auction
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    inequity aversion
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    mechanism design
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    two-sided asymmetric information
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