Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions (Q465694): Difference between revisions

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+How hard is it to control an election?
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+Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
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+Q3112639
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+How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
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+Why the Count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet
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+The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Stability in Voting
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+Q5844986
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+Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
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+Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
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+Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
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+The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
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+Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
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+Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
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+A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
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+Manipulation of social choice functions
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+Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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+The complexity of Kemeny elections
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+Exact analysis of Dodgson elections
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+Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
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+Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
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+Minimizing makespan in a two-machine flow shop with delays and unit-time operations is NP-hard
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+The subgraph homeomorphism problem
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+When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
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+How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
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+Reflections on Multivariate Algorithmics and Problem Parameterization
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+Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
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+Swap Bribery
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+A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
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+The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
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+The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
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+Dichotomy for voting systems
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+Publication:465694