Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort (Q1602939): Difference between revisions
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Property / cites work: Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments. / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents / rank | |||
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Revision as of 10:12, 4 June 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort |
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Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort (English)
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24 June 2002
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competitive price
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competitive contract
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productive agent
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