Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort (Q1602939): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 10:12, 4 June 2024

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Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
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    Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort (English)
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    24 June 2002
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    competitive price
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    competitive contract
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    productive agent
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