Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management (Q1804612): Difference between revisions

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+Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
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+Q4070950
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+An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
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+A Theory of Wage Dynamics
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+Managerial Incentives, Investment and Aggregate Implications: Scale Effects
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+Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
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