Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments (Q1867834): Difference between revisions

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+The core of the matching game
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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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+Normal rank
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+The welfaristic characterization of two-person revelation equilibria under imputational government
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+Manipulation via Endowments
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Q3999327
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+Manipulation through bribes
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+The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic
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+Q4280490
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+Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
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+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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