Essentially stable matchings (Q2178028): Difference between revisions

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+House allocation with existing tenants
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+Fair student placement
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+Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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+School choice under partial fairness
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+Rational expectations and farsighted stability
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+Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
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+(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
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+Farsightedly stable networks
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+An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
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+The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages
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+School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup>
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+Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
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+Making just school assignments
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+Networks and farsighted stability
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+The Farsighted Stable Set
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+On cores and indivisibility
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+A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
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+Obvious manipulations
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+Q5844986
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+A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games
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