Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats (Q682462): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 01:09, 15 July 2024

scientific article
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English
Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats
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    Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats (English)
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    2 February 2018
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    principal-agent
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    dynamic contracts
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    moral hazard
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    incentives
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