Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities (Q1691346): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+House allocation with existing tenants
@@ Property / cites work: House allocation with existing tenants / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
@@ Property / cites work: Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficient assignment respecting priorities
@@ Property / cites work: Efficient assignment respecting priorities / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Constrained school choice
@@ Property / cites work: Constrained school choice / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Robust stability in matching markets
@@ Property / cites work: Robust stability in matching markets / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Making just school assignments
@@ Property / cites work: Making just school assignments / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
@@ Property / cites work: Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On cores and indivisibility
@@ Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Queue allocation of indivisible goods
@@ Property / cites work: Queue allocation of indivisible goods / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods / rank @@
+Normal rank