Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets (Q1757082): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Set OpenAlex properties.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Core in a simple coalition formation game / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A note on the uniqueness of stable marriage matching / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Corrigendum to ``On randomized matching mechanisms'' [Econ. Theory 8 (1996) 377--381] / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4130997 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Stable marriages and search frictions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On randomized matching mechanisms / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4273943 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Transformation from arbitrary matchings to stable matchings / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 18:20, 17 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
scientific article

    Statements

    Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    28 December 2018
    0 references
    two-sided matching markets
    0 references
    stability
    0 references
    uniqueness
    0 references
    Knuth's decentralized algorithm
    0 references

    Identifiers