Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information (Q645061): Difference between revisions

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+Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
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+Position Auctions with Consumer Search
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+Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products
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+Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
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+The role of optimal threats in auction design
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+A note on optimal allocation mechanisms
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+A multiple-object auction with superadditive values
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+Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
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+Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
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+Participation constraints in adverse selection models
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+An optimal auction for complements
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+Countervailing incentives in agency problems
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+Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
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+Optimal Auction Design
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+Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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