Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result (Q2404219): Difference between revisions

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+Commitment and observability in games
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+Normal rank
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+Unobserved Delegation
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+Normal rank
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+First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
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+Normal rank
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+Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
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+Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
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+Strategic delegation under quality competition
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+Normal rank
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+Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage
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+Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly
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+COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION, R&amp;D AND COLLUSION
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+Q5449942
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+Normal rank
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+Games with imperfectly observable commitment
@@ Property / cites work: Games with imperfectly observable commitment / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
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