An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable (Q1268651): Difference between revisions
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Property / cites work: Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Endogenous Formation of Coalitions / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 16:55, 28 May 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable |
scientific article |
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An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable (English)
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18 October 1998
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noncooperative linking game
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cooperation structures
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