Computing a pessimistic Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple followers: the mixed-pure case (Q2309467): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 04:36, 22 July 2024

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Computing a pessimistic Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple followers: the mixed-pure case
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    Computing a pessimistic Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple followers: the mixed-pure case (English)
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    1 April 2020
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    leader-follower games
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    Stackelberg equilibria
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    pessimistic bilevel programming
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