Q5015388 (Q5015388): Difference between revisions

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+Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
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+Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
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+Q3266133
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+Testing for the consecutive ones property, interval graphs, and graph planarity using PQ-tree algorithms
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+A characterization of the single-crossing domain
@@ Property / cites work: A characterization of the single-crossing domain / rank @@
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+A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Unidimensional Unfolding Representations
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+The original Borda count and partial voting
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+The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
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+The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
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+Q5668657
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+Incidence matrices and interval graphs
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+Exact analysis of Dodgson elections
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+The complexity of Kemeny elections
@@ Property / cites work: The complexity of Kemeny elections / rank @@
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+An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
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+Q5283030
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+A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
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