C-complete sets for compromise stable games (Q471023): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 02:15, 9 December 2024

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C-complete sets for compromise stable games
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    C-complete sets for compromise stable games (English)
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    13 November 2014
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    The paper investigates the relationship between compromise stability of transferable utility games and efficient payoff vectors; specifically, the main results study the structure of the generators of the core cover, and conditions ensuring that the game is compromise stable.
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    core
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    core cover
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    larginal vectors
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    TU-game
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